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Introduction: Thinking with Algorithms: Cognition and Computation in the Work of 
N. Katherine Hayles 
Louise Amoore  
 
The microcomputer […] allows mathematics to be practiced as an experimental 
science. It has also affected how people have imaged themselves and their relation 
to the world (Hayles, 1991: 6).  
 
In 2016, Google’s Natural Language Understanding research group began to train a deep 
neural network algorithm on a corpus of data comprising the literary works of 1000 
deceased authors, from William Shakespeare to Daniel Defoe and from Virginia Woolf to 
Herman Melville.1 The machine learning algorithm was reported by the scientists to have 
discovered the style of particular authors from their body of work, so that “given a sentence 
from a book and knowledge of the author’s style and personality” the model could also 
“predict what the author is most likely to write next”. 2 In fact, the algorithm had done what 
many neural network machine learning algorithms do: it had clustered the literature 
according to the patterns in the text as data, and then defined these clusters in terms of 
the attributes of the author’s body of work. Once recognised and learned, these attributes 
became a means to identify the future attributes of as yet unknown texts. This apparently 
frivolous and innocuous experiment actually has immense significance for how people 
have imaged themselves and their relation to the world amid new computational forms. 
Unlike deductive forms of reasoning, where a rule or hypothesis is formulated and tested 
empirically, these algorithms are inductively generating potential attributes from the 
patterns within a corpus of data. Not only of epistemological significance, such processes 
of machine learning algorithms identifying clusters from data, generating attributes, and 
finding those attributes in the patterns of other people, are also shaping relations to the 
world, from Cambridge Analytica’s attributes of voters to SKYNET’s attributes of terrorist 
threat (Grothoff and Porup 2016).  
   
The Google Natural Language experiments are but one example of how what N. Katherine 
Hayles has termed “computational regimes” are turning to literature3 – and indeed other 
cultural media such as music and film – precisely in order to supply deep learning 
algorithms with a corpus of data from which they can refine their cognitive models of the 
world. As the Google computer scientists explain the motivation for their 1000 authors 
project, it is “an early step towards better understanding intent”.4 The algorithmic practices 
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that are pressing upon the politics and ethics of our times are geared toward a particular 
kind of question: given the attributes of a cluster within a corpus of data, what is the 
incipient future intent? This could be future voting intentions, the intent to commit fraud, the 
intent to buy life insurance, or the intent to stream a specific video. At the level of the 
technique what matters is not so much the content as the inferred future. So, teaching an 
algorithm to differentiate styles and sensibilities within literature – for example how one 
author’s use of the line “who’s there?” means something different to another author’s use 
of the same line in another text – is actually also about teaching algorithms to make finite 
distinctions and to infer meanings in the future. Contemporary algorithms being used 
across domains, from credit card fraud to voter preference to counter terrorism, are being 
trained to understand future intent through the attributes of style and genre. In short, the 
conjoined histories of reading and learning in science and literature are finding new forms 
with the machine learning algorithms of the twenty-first century.  
  
At this contemporary moment, when it might appear that science and literature, and humans 
and machines, are coevolving in novel and often troubling ways, the work of N. Katherine 
Hayles stands as compelling testament that these histories have never been separable. A 
literary theorist with a background in science, Hayles has consistently and imaginatively 
insisted upon a “technogenesis” of “reciprocal causality between human bodies and 
technics” (2012: 123). With technogenesis, humans and technologies coevolve so that the 
“interactions of language with code” bring about cognitive and neural changes in humans 
(2012: 10). Though I suspect that Hayles would not wish it to be said that she had 
anticipated, via her deep theorization of human and machine cognition, the unfolding 
computational phenomena of our times, I also note that this sense of extraordinary foresight 
is something which is rather commonly said of the men who theorise computational logics 
and societal transformation.5 Similarly, though I do not think it likely that Hayles would wish 
to hear of a “Haylesian” approach to theorising contemporary computation, on all of the 
evidence this would be warranted and, again, it is commonplace to hear of the “Latourian”. 
And so, I consider it to be of real significance that, 27 years ago, in the introduction to her 
edited work on literature and the science of chaos theory, Hayles foresees the elements of 
an algorithmic computational regime that had not yet fully emerged. When she notes that 
the computer allows mathematics “to be practiced as an experimental science”, Hayles 
opens the way to understanding entangled and collaborative human and machine inferences 
that feel their way towards a solution (1991: 6). In this passage she describes someone 
sitting down at a computer “to model a dynamical non-linear system” where she “need not 
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proceed through the traditional mathematical method of theorem-proof” but can “set up a 
recursive program” (6). “With her own responses in a feedback loop with the computer, she 
develops an intuitive feeling for how the display and parameters interact”, writes Hayles, 
describing the embodied interactions between the human neural system and the system of 
nonlinear differential equations (6). It is precisely such insight into the recursivity of human-
computer relations, and the modifications this implies for traditional deductive methods, that 
is of crucial significance to understanding the computation of our times.  
 
Over the period of the 27 years since Katherine Hayles wrote those lines, she describes a 
historical “arc” across three of her texts – How We Became Posthuman (1999), Writing 
Machines (2001), and My Mother Was a Computer (2005) – from the cybernetics of the mid-
twentieth century to the present “versions of the posthuman as they continue to evolve in 
conjunction with intelligent machines” (2005: 2).6 Yet, preceding this arc, the 1991 work does 
seem to anticipate the experimental and intuitive practices of the twenty-first century’s 
machine learning algorithms, where designers sit before a model they have trained on a 
corpus of data. Today, the training of a convolutional neural network for image recognition, 
for example, involves many millions of parameters, certainly exceeding what the designer 
can meaningfully observe (Krizhevsky, Sutskever and Hinton, 2012). As Luciana Parisi 
captures it in her essay in this special issue, we are witnessing “a new mode of algorithmic 
processing” that “learns from data without following explicit programming” and “without 
abiding by the formal language of mathematics”. Hayles’ depiction of iterative and co-
evolving interactions – observing the output and adjusting the probability weights in the 
model – nonetheless signals in 1991 the sense-making and meaning making collaborations 
between human and machine that will dramatically shape the world. It is these questions of 
thought and cognition, and how operations of thinking and cognition are distributed across 
human and technical agencies, that Hayles turns to in her two most recent books. In How 
We Think (2012), Hayles investigates the multiple forms of reading involved in engaging 
digital and print media, proposing that “machine reading might be a first pass toward making 
visible patterns that human reading could then interpret”, opening new possibilities for 
cognition and for critical thought (2012: 29). In her Unthought (2017), Hayles extends her 
concept of cognition, challenging the human/nonhuman binary and offering “another 
distinction: cognizers versus noncognizers” in which “on one side are humans and all other 
biological life forms, as well as many technical systems” and “on the other, material 
processes and inanimate objects” (2017: 30). It is this recognition of the cognitive power of 
technical systems, and specifically their capacity to exercise choice and make decisions, 
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that has afforded Hayles’ work such significance to contemporary debates. Yet, the cognitive 
power of technologies should be understood in its longer genesis across the analogue and 
digital forms of computation Hayles brings to our attention. Returning to the 1000 authors 
project, perhaps a Haylesian reading would urge caution with the idea that forms of machine 
reading are subsuming the human forms of deep reading of these authors. The human and 
the algorithm are co-evolving, yielding new modes of reading and cognition that do not 
readily map onto conventional notions of the human and the machine.  
 
Thinking With Algorithms 
 
This special issue of Theory, Culture & Society focuses on the literary theorist N. Katherine 
Hayles’ oeuvre at the intersection of literature and computational science and technology. 
Each of the invited papers was presented at a workshop at Durham University in 2015, held 
with Hayles, and focused on her work in the context of contemporary debates on algorithms 
in society. The series of articles respond in different ways to the provocations of Hayles’ 
work – engaging, challenging and extending the possibilities of her texts. In a direct sense, 
the articles signal the multiple manifestations of the computational regimes Hayles has 
mapped, from the algorithmic interactions of high frequency trading (Mackenzie) to the 
personalization of recommendation algorithms (Lury and Day). The multiple forms of 
Hayles’s non-conscious cognition appear to us in different ways across the essays, with the 
apparently non-conscious human propensities that are considered not fully knowable to us 
becoming amenable to the differently non-conscious impulses of technical cognizers that 
generate clusters, sentiments and attributes. The collection is also intended to draw 
attention to what I see as a form of neglect in many contemporary accounts that have been 
caught up with the “digital”, as for example in some variants of digital geographies, software 
studies, and data sociologies. The work of N. Katherine Hayles, over many decades, has 
opened the world of machinic and human reading and writing to thought and to literary 
practice. This is part of a longstanding body of work in the humanities, as well as in feminist 
and posthuman historical scholarship on science and technology (Haraway, 1991; Braidotti, 
2013; Daston, 1988), that has not always received sufficient attention amid the 
contemporary desire to understand the digital, the virtual, or the cyber. To think with 
algorithms in these terms would also involve a thought that imagines human bodies as 
always already caught up in the algorithms thought to be governing them. It would mean 
that many of the questions animating current ethico-political debate on algorithmic 
accountability or automation anxiety would be rephrased to capture the historical durability 
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of concepts of perception, time, and decision. Do algorithms compute beyond the threshold 
of human perceptibility and consciousness? Can ‘cognizing’ and ‘learning’ digital devices 
reflect or engage the durational experience of time? Do digital forms of cognition radically 
transform workings of the human brain and what humans can perceive or decide? How do 
algorithms act upon other algorithms, and how might we understand their recursive learning 
from each other? What kind of sociality or associative life emerges from the human-machinic 
cognitive relations that we see with association rules and analytics? 
 
In this introduction I draw out a set of themes from Hayles’ work, identified as key animating 
ideas that give life to particular aspects of the contemporary debates on algorithmic 
computation and cognition. These themes are present across the different essays in the 
special issue and they are threads that run through the major contributions of Hayles’ work 
across disciplines: human and technical cognitions; feedback loops and forms of reason; 
and ethics and futures. The special issue concludes with an interview with N. Katherine 
Hayles, in which she discusses her work on cognition and computation as it is formulated in 
her book Unthought, and responds to some of the questions arising from the essays in this 
issue.  
 
“When we design technical cognitive systems, we are partially designing ourselves”: 
human-algorithm interactions7 
 
In a discussion of Stanislaw Lem’s 1976 novella ‘The Mask’, Katherine Hayles details the 
partial and distributed nature of what we call human agency (2005: 172-3). “We are no longer 
the featherless biped that can think”, she writes, but a “hybrid creature that enfolds within 
itself the rationality of the conscious mind and the coding operations of the machine” (2005: 
192). Detailing the “machine within the human” and the “human within the machine”, Hayles 
defines anew the problem of human agency in relation to the machine. In place of a long-
held sense of human agents as rational beings exercising free will in the world, Hayles 
shows how the sense of self and world is bound up with underlying programmes so that 
“coding technology becomes central to understanding the human condition” (2005: 192). 
Understood in this way, thinking with algorithms could only ever be an entangled and 
collaborative venture in which analogue and digital forms of computation and cognition dwell 
together. This hybrid and collaborative mode of cognition is further elaborated in Unthought, 
where Hayles develops the concept of a “cognitive assemblage” to depict the “arrangement 
of systems, subsystems, and individual actors through which information flows, effecting 
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transformations through the interpretative activities of cognizers operating upon the flows” 
(2017: 118). Here, the technical cognitive system is composed of multiple elements, humans 
and algorithms among them, each of these elements interconnected so that “the cognitive 
decisions of each affect the others” (2017: 118).  
 
From the algorithmic infrastructures of smart cities to the use of autonomous weapons in 
contemporary warfare, Hayles’ insights remind us that the design of technical cognitive 
capacities also necessarily involves a redesignation of what it means to be human. 
“Autonomous drones and drone swarms would operate with different distributions of 
choices, interpretations, and decisions”, she writes, but they too will necessarily “participate 
in a complex assemblage involving human and technical cognizers” )2017: 136). Given this 
complex assemblage, with its different distributions of decision, what is at stake for the way 
one studies algorithms? As Celia Lury and Sophie Day discuss in their study of 
recommendation algorithms in this special issue, the algorithms function as a “composite of 
algorithmic and human reasoning”. And yet, the dividuated human subjects that are 
generated through the chains of “like” relations in recommendation systems, as they 
describe, run counter to traditional conventions of a unified subject, instead embodying 
algorithmic processes “such that one is always more and less than one”. The subject of the 
recommendation algorithm, then, dwells among human and technical cognizers so that the 
distribution of decisions does not map directly to the “one” of the liberal human subject. In 
her analysis of Shelly Jackson’s electronic hypertext, Patchwork Girl, Katherine Hayles 
describes how the “unified subject is thus broken apart and reassembled as a multiplicity” 
via electronic media that distribute coding and decoding “between the writer, computer and 
user” (2005: 151). This redistribution of the text as a “flickering signifier” is arguably not 
confined to the spaces of story writing, but proliferates also in the kinds of recommendation 
algorithms depicted by Lury and Day, where subjectivities are enacted in what Hayles calls 
“flexible and mutating ways” (2005: 154). 
  
As Luciana Parisi suggests in this special issue, Hayles’ work “offers a re-reading of the 
epistemological distinction between human and non-human cognition” and, specifically, a 
re-reading of how non-human cognizers interact with other human and non-human cognitive 
agents. The effects of cognition, as distinct from thought, have been manifest particularly in 
systems where algorithms interact with, and learn from, other algorithms in order to enact 
decisions. Indeed, Hayles devotes one chapter of her book Unthought to the study of high-
frequency trading (HFT) in financial derivatives markets. In the context of vast increases in 
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processor speed, computer memory, and the use of fibre optic cables, Hayles identifies a 
“temporal gap between human and technical cognition” that she suggests creates “a realm 
of autonomy for technical agency” (2017: 142). What might take place in this space of 
relative technical autonomy? In his essay on HFT in this special issue, Donald Mackenzie 
is interested in what he calls, following Erving Goffman, the “interaction order” of algorithms. 
“Among the things an algorithm does in automated trading”, writes Mackenzie, is to have 
“material effects on the behaviour of other algorithms”. Detailing how the object of the “order 
book” emerges, Mackenzie describes the “human traders” who, like the algorithms with 
whom they work, “simultaneously observe and construct the object of their attention”. In this 
way, the temporal gap Hayles identifies is manifest in the technologies of “spoofing” and 
“queuing” Mackenzie recounts in his study. Indeed, Hayles engages with Ann-Christina 
Lange’s work on HFT in order to emphasize how “algorithms are constantly interacting with 
other algorithms, generating a complex ecology that, Lange suggests, can be understood 
as swarm behaviour” (2017: 163).8 In the financial practice of HFT, then, the cognitive 
assemblage enrols human and algorithmic interactions that take place across different 
temporal registers. Such readings, as one sees across work by Hayles, Lange, and 
Mackenzie, substantially complicate the widespread claims to a “speeding up” of the world 
amid the dominance of algorithms over human decisions. Similarly, the very notion of a 
liberal human subject is reframed so that, as Michael Dieter argues in his essay on chrono-
design and user experience, “conceptions of a fully-informed, self deliberative actor become 
complicated” in algorithmic systems of cognition. What it means to action a trade, to design 
an interface, to queue or to spoof, is transformed in and through the composite cognitions 
of humans with algorithms, and algorithms with other algorithms.    
 
“Recursive feedback loops cycling between different levels of coding”: algorithmic 
forms of reason9 
 
Reflecting on Norbert Wiener’s mid-twentieth century concerns for the cybernetic paradigm, 
Katherine Hayles notes that: 
 
Half a century later, we can see with the benefit of hindsight in what ways the 
cybernetic paradigm was both prophetic and misguided. It was correct in anticipating 
that modes of communication between humans, non-human life-forms, and machines 
would become increasingly critical to the future of the planet; it was wrong in thinking 
that feedback mechanisms were the key to controlling this future (Hayles, 2017: 202). 
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Alongside the distribution of agency and cognition, then, the recursivity of interactions have 
exceeded the capacity of traditional notions of control. With the recursive feedback 
mechanism – a technic present across Hayles’ oeuvre – Hayles signals the limit points of 
formal mathematical and computational systems and the possibilities of novel forms of 
reason more attuned to the “incomputable, the undecidable, and the unknowable” (2017: 
202). Understood in this way, the feedback loop that was so central to cybernetic forms of 
reason and control becomes a recursive and iterative logic that exceeds notions of control.10 
As contemporary machine learning algorithms deploy back propagation to train multilayer 
architectures, the notion of feeding back has become a crucial feature of unsupervised 
learning that precisely no longer requires control. In her essay, Parisi extends what she 
describes as Katherine Hayles’ identification of a fundamental problem in our present, that 
is the tension between logics of automation and reason. Parisi identifies a “shift in 
computational models of logical reasoning” from enlightenment forms of “deductive truths 
applied to small data” to contemporary computational forms of the “inductive retrieval and 
recombination of infinite data volumes”. Extending and developing Hayles’ account of the 
computational regime, Parisi draws out a key aspect of the forms of reason advancing with 
machine learning. Similarly, Lury and Day propose that personalization via algorithm is not 
“a slide from one to many and back again” but instead a form of enumeration that is 
conducted through “forms of de- and re-aggregation” and “recursive induction in types or 
classes”.  
 
Such elaboration of the precise forms of reason advanced with machine learning algorithms 
is significant because it rather fundamentally challenges causal accounts of algorithmic 
actions upon the world. In place of an account of algorithms where the effects of their actions 
can be located in their origins or source codes, it becomes possible to give an account of 
algorithms as generating, and generated by, the relations between input data and their 
outputs. As Parisi puts the problem, “machine learning is the inverse of programming: the 
question is not to deduce the output for a given algorithm, but rather to find the algorithm 
that produces this output”. In contrast to visions of the algorithm as a linear series of 
programmable steps, this abductive form of reason marks a generative process of the 
discovery of structure within large data sets.  
 
Rather as Hayles’ 1991 account of computation envisaged a regime that “allows 
mathematics to be practiced as an experimental science”, then, the inductive or abductive 
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logics of machine learning experiment with outputs, adjusting probability weights in order to 
optimize the algorithm. Where Tobias Matzner suggests in his essay, contra Parisi, that the 
“stability of the world” is a “precondition of algorithm design”, the experimental design of 
machine learning algorithms seems precisely to profit from instability and uncertainty 
because these conditions yield data to the corpus for learning. Michael Dieter’s close study 
of the practice of user experience design, for example, observes processes of “accelerated 
pattern recognition, the synthesis of sensory inputs, and the capacity to draw inferences” in 
the algorithmic experiments for optimization. Donald Mackenzie’s essay similarly describes 
financial traders he interviewed as “experimenting with artificial intelligence machine 
learning techniques” such as support vector machines to distinguish “real from spoof orders” 
in more sophisticated ways. Again, the machine learning methods required to define 
similarities and differences – such as the support vector machines Mackenzie observes – 
inductively generate their similarity measures from the attributes of the data they are 
exposed to (Alpaydin, 2016: 116; Mackenzie, 2017: 73).  
 
As Katherine Hayles notes in the epilogue to My Mother was a Computer, the cyberneticians 
of the mid twentieth century were the architects of “feedback loops connecting human and 
machine” and yet they had “not quite grasped” that “recursivity could become a spiral rather 
than a circle” (2005: 241). In short, the architects of the feedback loop as computational logic 
did not quite foresee its capacity to generate emergent behaviours that would spiral beyond 
a paradigm of control and form the parameters of modes of reason attuned to uncertainty 
and contingency. Perhaps our current moment, with the encroachment of algorithms on 
democratic elections, referenda, and the judicial system, is witnessing what Hayles 
describes as “the uncertainties, potentialities, and dangers” of the algorithmic regime of 
computation (2005: 242). It is to these latent potentialities and dangers that I now turn.   
 
“Ethics Cannot Be Plastered on as an Afterthought”: algorithms and positive 
futures11 
 
In an interview published in this special issue, N. Katherine Hayles reflects on her own 
contribution to the formulation of ethical responses to the penetration of algorithmic 
decisions into so many aspects of contemporary life, saying that she does not consider 
herself to be an “ethicist”. The reading of her work that I offer here, however, considers that 
she has a profound sense of ethics as an orientation to oneself and to the world, and of the 
ethical and moral difficulties of being human. Consider, for example, her account of 
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posthuman embodiment, where she discusses whether, with the “rapid development of 
neural nets”, there could be a fundamental challenge to the “ethical imperative that humans 
keep control” (1999: 288). Hayles contrasts the “vision of the human in which conscious 
agency is the essence of human identity” with the posthuman view that “conscious agency 
has never been in control” (1999: 288). Citing feminist scholars of science such as Donna 
Haraway and Evelyn Fox Keller, Hayles suggests that the posthuman can offer another kind 
of account in which “distributed cognition replaces autonomous will; embodiment replaces 
a body seen as a support system for the mind; and a dynamic partnership between humans 
and intelligent machines replaces the liberal humanist subject’s manifest destiny to dominate 
and control nature” (1999: 288).  
 
Twenty years on from Hayles’ mapping of the potentiality of the posthuman to decentre 
human conscious agency, the dominant societal and scholarly accounts of ethical response 
to algorithms remains wedded to the control functions of the liberal humanist subject (O’Neil, 
2016). It is perhaps more important than ever that Hayles’ call for embodied accounts of 
dynamic partnerships are brought into conversations on drone warfare, autonomous 
weapons, and robot futures, where the capacity for human control and mastery of the 
algorithms has too often become the focus of ethico-politics.12 Indeed, in Unthought Hayles 
urges us to consider the potentiality of non-conscious forms of cognition to extend new 
opportunities for human thought and critique. Whilst she never loses sight of the ethical 
effects of the assemblages of algorithmic warfare, she nonetheless seeks to “move from 
thinking about the individual” as site of responsibility and free will, toward thinking about “the 
consequences of the actions the assemblage as a whole performs” (2017: 37). For Hayles, 
this mode of ethics means that “effective ethical intervention has to be intrinsic to the 
operation of the system itself” so that the sites of “inflection points” can be located within a 
cognitive assemblage (2017: 204). What does this mean for those who research the actions 
of algorithms in the world? It means becoming “knowledgeable about how the 
interpenetrations of human and technical cognitions work as specific sites”, devoting 
methodological time to understanding computational regimes up close and in their 
operations. 
 
The essays assembled in this special issue may be read as engagements with this 
invocation to understand a computational regime in detail and to identify the inflection points 
where intervention might be possible. Such inflection points take multiple forms. In his 
discussion of the trapping of “technical delays and waiting times within tolerable limits”, for 
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example, Michael Dieter engages the specific and distinct micro temporalities of information. 
Donald Mackenzie’s close study of HFT regimes exposes that “it is human beings, not 
algorithms, that are angered by perceived queue jumping” and it is “humans, not algorithms, 
that are prosecuted for spoofing”. Here the potential inflection points reside in the moments 
where the different temporalities and affective registers – delays, emotions of anger, 
tolerable thresholds, fears of prosecution – are juxtaposed or drawn together in tension with 
one another. The point is that engaging the technical cognitions in detail can yield a different 
way of relating to the system ethically and politically. As Adrian Mackenzie has argued in his 
compelling account of the archaeology of machine learning algorithms, understanding how 
a specific algorithm such as a random forest “orders differences” could provide a means to 
“change how we relate to” one of the material instantiations of such algorithms in the world, 
such as in border and immigration controls (2017: 11). 
 
Of course, for Hayles the reading of the close detail of a computational regime draws much 
of its resource from the humanities and, particularly, from the “specific dynamics” that 
“novels enact that are not already present” (2017: 198). Among the specific dynamics of 
novels, Hayles notes that “novels explore ethical issues in specific and concrete terms” 
(2017: 200). The decision enacted within the novel’s form is already freighted with political, 
ethical, technical, and affective weights of meaning. Hayles’ account of the ethicality of the 
novel’s form can serve as a reminder that the decisions of the computational regime are 
also already weighted with the biases, probabilities, and discriminations contained within 
algorithms. In her book Writing Machines, Hayles experiments with “what the book can be 
in the digitial age” (2002: 9). Writing in the third person, and under the name “Kaye” (related 
to Hayles, but “not the same”), Hayles enacts the displaced authorship and partial 
perspective that feels familiar to us from literature, but also increasingly familiar as a function 
of the kinds of personalization algorithms studied by Lury and Day – not quite the one of I, 
always something less and more than this. Experimenting with the form of writing and the 
novel, Hayles vividly conjures the ethical difficulties of the human protagonist who finds 
herself enmeshed within technical cognitive systems and yet also the subject of an 
“asymmetric distribution of ethical responsibility in whether actions are finally taken” (2017: 
136). As the essays of this special issue elucidate, this is not primarily a question of 
resolution, nor of resolving or ethically modifying the distribution of responsibility. Instead, 
as Hayles’ work has mapped over decades, it is a question of how the science that 
“underwrites the Regime of Computation” can yield the potential to “deepen our 
understanding of what it means to be in the world rather than apart from it” (2005: 242).  
12 
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